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SOME PHASES OF THE EXEMPTION LAWS
By LYMAN P. WELD, President, Boulder County Bar
Association
HE General Assembly shall pass liberal homestead and
Colorado Constitution, Article
laws."
exemption
XVIII,
Section 1.
This has been done, the bulk of the exemption laws pertaining to personal property appear in sections 5913-5923,
C. L. Colo. 1921.
However, no statutory method, except to a limited extent, has been provided whereby the debtor whose property
has been seized can make claim for his exemption. Referring
to this subject, our Supreme Court has said: "Our statutes are
silent on the subject." Blum vs. Kasnik, 10 Pac. (2nd) 384.
But by statute a debtor whose property is seized under writ of
attachment issued out of the Justice Court may make claim of
exemption before the Justice of the Peace. Sections 61076108, C. L. Colo. 1921. Such claim may be made orally.
Bassett vs. Inman, 7 Colo. 270; 3 Pac. 383.
Certainly in fairness and justice to a debtor a plain,
simple method should be provided by statute whereby the
debtor may make claim of exemption to property seized
which he may claim to be exempt, and have the issue tried
immediately.
While sections 6107-6108, C. L. Colo. 1921, provide a
debtor may, in cases of writ of attachment issued out of a
Justice Court, make claim of exemption to property in such
court, he is not obligated to do so, but may make demand for
its return and if not returned wait until the property is sold
and then bring suit for treble damages. Collard vs. Hohnstein, 64 Colo. 478; 174 Pac. 596.
"If any officer or other person, by virtue of any execution or other process, or by any right of distress, shall take or
seize any of the articles of property hereinbefore exempted
from levy and sale, such officer or person shall be liable to the
party injured for three times the value of the property illegally taken or seized, to be recovered by action of trespass,
with costs of suit." Section 5921, C. L. Colo. 1921.
The application of this particular statute has resulted in
considerable litigation. The space allotted me does not per-
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mit an extensive discussion of all of such cases, so I shall only
call attention to a few of them.
An early Colorado case dealing with the question of
treble damages was that of Wymond vs. Arnsbury, 2 Colo.
213. A constable had seized certain wearing apparel and certain household goods and was sued for three times the value
thereof. Our Supreme Court in deciding this case uses the
following language: "Defendant in error testified he was the
owner of the goods taken. As to the wearing apparel, this
was probably sufficient, for as to such goods, the ownership
may show the use to which they were applied. But in household goods, such as beds and bedding and the like, the statute
protects only such as are kept for the use of the debtor and his
family, and these must be of certain kinds, which are described, or if of other kinds, not exceeding $100 in value.
The evidence is silent as to the use of the goods by the defendant in error, and his family, and the value of those not enumerated in the statute, points upon which it should be
explicit."
In Klug vs. Corder, 82 Colo. 318; 259 Pac. 613 (the
same case coming again to the Supreme Court and being reported in 15 Pac. (2nd) 621), it was held that a motor
vehicle could, in some cases, dependent upon the nature of its
use, be held exempt as a farm wagon. The facts in this case
being that Corder as sheriff of Weld County had seized a
Buick automobile under writ of execution, and Klug claimed
the same as exempt as a farm wagon and on his demand for
its return being refused, he brought suit for damages in the
sum of approximately $3,500, being three times the value of
the automobile. It was finally determined by the jury that
the automobile, not being used as a farm wagon, was not
exempt.
A reference to the statute will show that in certain cases
property to a certain value is exempt, and on passing some of
these sections it has been held: "Where the debtor only has
the amount, kind and value of property which is exempt, a
levy and sale thereof is illegal unless exemption be waived and
the officer seizing the same is liable for damages to three times
the value of the property." Sanberg vs. Bordstadt, 48 Colo.
96; 109 Pac. 419.
In the case of Duncan vs. Burchinell, 14 C. A. 471; 61
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Pac. 61, the Court in a very lengthy opinion goes into the
respective rights of the debtor and of the officer arising out of
claims for property seized which the debtor claims as exempt,
and I desire to give a few of the points as laid down in this
decision. They are:
(1). Our statutes do not require a debtor to claim exemption if the property be wholly exempt, but where the
officer is not chargeable with knowledge of the debtor's right
to retain specific property and makes levy in good faith, upon
settled principles in order that the duty of returning the property may be cast upon the officer, demand must be made for it.
(2).
Such demand must be made within a reasonable
time and what is a reasonable time must be determined from
the facts and circumstances in each case.
The right to make such demand may be waived,
(3).
and such waiver may be by conduct as well as by words.
(4). If demand is made for the return of the goods
the officer must return the goods within a reasonable time, or
be subject to an action for treble damages, but what is a reasonable time depends upon all of the facts and circumstances
of each case.
I wish to give particularly the facts in the court's decision in brief in the case of Smith vs. Pueblo M. & C. Co. et
al., 260 Pac. 109. The facts were one Thomas, sheriff of
Pueblo County, seized, under writ of attachment, an automobile belonging to Smith. Smith demanded the return of the
auto as exempt property on the grounds that it was a tool in
trade and that he had to use the same as a necessary means of
transportation of himself and his carpenter tools to and from
his work. The sheriff refused to return the property until
the question as to whether or not said property was exempt
was first tried by the court. The issue was then tried and the
property found to be exempt by the court and the automobile
was returned to Smith. He then brought suit against the
sheriff and the Pueblo company, as attaching creditor, for
three times the value of the car. The District Court ruled
against him and on appeal to Supreme Court the following
points were raised by the Pueblo company, defendant in error:
First: That as the property was not specifically made
exempt under the statute and it took a judicial decision to
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decide whether or not the property was exempt that the sheriff could not be held for treble damages. The Supreme Court
held that under the statutes the property having been declared
to be exempt, even though it was not specifically set out in the
statutes as exempt, nevertheless it having been determined to
be exempt the sheriff was liable for treble damages.
Second: It was argued that inasmuch as the sheriff had
a reasonable length of time in which to return the property
and as he only held it until the claim of exemption was tried
in the court and then returned it, he should not be held for
treble damages. The Supreme Court held that whenever an
officer compelled the debtor to go into court to prove the
property exempt that the holding of the property was for an
unreasonable length of time as a matter of law.
I wish also to call your attention to the case of Blum vs.
Kasnik, 90 Colo. 414; 10 Pac. (2nd) 384. The facts in this
case were one Venuti obtained judgment against Kasnik in the
District Court of the City and County of Denver. Execution
on such judgment was issued to Blum, sheriff of Boulder
County, who seized an automobile belonging to Kasnik. Kasnik claimed the auto was exempt as he was using it in selling
Watkins Products and also as a means of transportation as a
coal miner to and from his work. The attorneys for Venuti
then issued a citation upon Kasnik demanding that he appear
before the District Court of Denver at a time certain so that
the question of whether or not said car was exempt could be
tried. Kasnik refused to appear. The Denver District Court
then determined on the evidence introduced by Venuti that
the auto was not exempt and issued an order demanding Blum
to proceed with the sale thereof, which was done. Kasnik
then brought suit against Blum for three times the value of
the car. The court said: "Upon the question of the method
of disposition of claims for exemption the following appears
in 25 C. J. 148, No. 279. 'Express provision is made by
statute in some jurisdictions for the determination of the right
to exemption in a summary manner and the debtor may avail
himself of such remedy without resorting to his ordinary
remedy by action, and on the contrary such a remedy is not
exclusive unless the statute so provides. But in absence of
statute where the facts are not admitted, the court cannot
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assume the prerogative of a jury, and pass upon the debtor's
right to an exemption in a summary manner.' " The net
result of the decision in this case was that Blum, as sheriff, was
held for treble damages.
In the case of Pappas vs. Capps, 263 Pac. 411, being an
action in mandamus to compel the sheriff of Huerfano County
to levy upon an automobile owned by one Kartas, a judgment
debtor. The sheriff refused to make the levy and this action
was brought to compel him to do so. The sheriff's defense
was that the car was exempt and therefore he should not be
compelled to seize the same. The court held that the right of
exemption is a personal privilege that may be asserted or
waived by the judgment debtor and held for the plaintiff and
said that the writ of mandamus should have been issued.
This creates a situation in Colorado which seems to be
serious. The officer must levy upon property whether he
deems it exempt or not, and even if the issue is tried in the
court without the consent of the defendant and the property
is found not to be exempt and the sheriff is ordered to sell the
property, he is liable for treble damages, or in the event he
refuses to return the property on demand and insists that the
issue of exemption be first tried and then returns the property,
in the event the property is found by the court to be exempt,
he is nevertheless liable for treble damages, a situation which
is most unjust to the officers of the law.
From a study of the cases above cited and others such as
(Schwartz vs. Birnbaum, 21 Colo. 21: 39 Pac. 416; Weil
vs. Nevitt, 19 Colo. 10; 31 Pac. 487; Madera vs. Holdrege,
4 C. A. 126; 35 Pac. 52: Note 28 A. L. R., page 74), it
appears very plainly that the question of whether or not
property is exempt is not always an easy one to determine.
Several factors such as the nature of use, value, whether debtor
is living with family, etc., must be taken into consideration in
determining the problem, and to subject an officer to treble
damages in the event of a wrong guess as to the outcome of
the trial of the issue is certainly unfair and unjust.
To correct the situation which has been discussed, a bill
has been introduced in the Legislature, the same being Senate
Bill No. 33 (an identical measure being introduced in the
House as House Bill No. 173). This bill in short provides:
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Where property is seized under writ of execution or
attachment or other order of court, notice of such seizure
must be given to the debtor, the debtor within ten days after
being so served must make claim in the court out of which the
process was issued, his claim of exemption, describing the
property he claims to be exempt with the grounds for such
exemption. Thereupon the issue of whether or not the property is exempt is set down for trial in not less than five or
more than fifteen days. Notice of such trial is served on the
officer either personally or by leaving a copy thereof with his
deputy at his office and upon the plaintiff creditor either personally or by mailing a copy of notice to his attorney of record. The trial of the issue may be continued within the
discretion of the court or Justice of the Peace. If on trial of
the issue the property is found to be exempt, then it is ordered
returned and if the officer returns it within forty-eight hours,
he can only be held for actual damages. If he refuses to return
it for any reason, then he becomes liable for treble damages.
The bill also provides that if the debtor does not make his
claim of exemption within the ten days after being served of
notice of seizure he shall conclusively be deemed to have
waived his right of exemption and has no action against the
officer for damages for seizure.
The bill also provides that where property is seized and
the court finds a portion thereof is exempt and the property
consists of various items which may be divisible the court fixes
the value of each item and requests the defendant to choose
such property as he desires to claim to be exempt up to the
aggregate value of his exemption, the balance being held for
further order of court, or if the property is such that it is not
divisible, then the court may order the property sold and out
of the first proceeds of sale, the debtor is allowed the amount
of his statutory exemption.
This measure will, I believe, correct the situation which
has been discussed in this article, first, by giving to the debtor
a plain, simple remedy where he can make his claim of exemption and have a speedy trial as to whether the same is exempt;
and second, the officers of the law in making seizure of property under process of court in good faith will be protected
against suits for treble damages if the property having been
found to be exempt by the court is returned immediately.

MEDICOLEGAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN BLOOD
GROUPINGS
By PHILIP B. GILLIAM, of the Denver Bar

N A RECENT case in the Juvenile Court of Denver testimony on the results of a blood test was admitted in evidence on the issue of paternity. This case is believed to
be the first case in the history of the courts of Colorado in
which such evidence was used. There have been many confusing statements in regard to the conclusiveness of such tests
and as a result the courts of the United States have been reluctant about the admission of blood tests as evidence. Since
Landsteiner discovered the blood groups in 1900 the tests
have proven of great importance in Europe, and the reliability
of such tests has been established by more than 10,000 paternity cases alone. In spite of this fact there have been but few
cases in the United States on this subject.
Undoubtedly the question of paternity has always been
one of the most difficult issues to defend. This question is
always coming before the courts, and in view of the difficulty
in obtaining concrete evidence there has been a miscarriage of
justice in many cases. Although the blood test has been used
chiefly in paternity cases, it has also solved the problem of
mixed children, and furnished valuable clues in criminology.
For legal purposes the test is fairly simple and the results
are easy to explain before a jury. In brief, Landsteiner discovered that human bloods can be subdivided into definite
groups because of the ability of the serum of one person to
agglutinate or unite the red blood cells of another. From his
observations he correctly came to the conclusion that only certain blood groups could appear in a child from the mating of
parents having known blood groups, and that other blood
groups were impossible. Landsteiner developed two tests to
determine the blood groups, and these tests are absolutely independent of each other. In both tests they can take all
possible matings of man and woman and determine without
question the possible children and the children not possible.
113
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The following charts illustrate these tests:
INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION

Groups of Parents
(All possible matings)
OxO
OxA
OxB
AxA
AxB
BxB

OxAB
A x AB
B x AB
AB x AB

Groups of Children
Possible
0
0,A
O,B
0,A
0, A, B, AB
0,B
A,B
A, B, AB
A, B, AB
A, B, AB

Groups of Children
Not Possible
A, B, AB
B, AB
A, AB
B, AB
A, AB
0, AB
0
0
0

HETERO CLASSIFICATION

Types of Parents
(Ali possible matings)
M/N/
M/N/
M/N/
M/NM,/NM-N/

x
x
x
x
x
x

M/N/
M-N/
M/NM-N/
M/NM-N/

Types of Children
Possible

Types of Children
Not Possible

M/N/, M/N-, M-N/
MAN/, M-N/
M/N/, M/NM/N/
M/NM-N/

M/NM-N/
M/N-, M-N/
M/N/, M-N/
M/N/, M/N-

How the blood groups can be applied in an actual paternity case is illustrated in the following two hypothetical examples: A man charged with the paternity of a child denies
the charge, so the blood groups of man, woman and child are
determined. The man is found to belong to Group A, the
woman to Group A, and the child to Group B (see mating 4
of the International classification). Since the mother does not
possess agglutinogen B, but the child does, this agglutinogen
must have come from the father, who could therefore only
belong to Group B or Group AB. The blood groups in this
case, therefore, have furnished absolute proof of the man's
innocence. Let us suppose, on the other hand, that in another
similar case the blood groups were as follows: man, Group
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B; woman, Group A; and child, Group AB. As may be seen
from the International classification (see mating 5), such a
combination of groups is entirely possible. This, however, is
no proof that the man charged with paternity is the true
father; for in a population such as that present in this country, about 15 per cent of all individuals belong to Group B.
The man in question is no more proved to be the father than
is any other man belonging to the same group. Blood groups,
therefore, are of no value as an aid to proving paternity; they
can only be used to prove non-paternity.
In not every case where a man is unjustly accused of
paternity is it possible to exclude him as a father of the child.
Thus, if the putative father and the true father both belong
to the same group, no exclusion will be possible. By using
both tests as illustrated by the chart it is possible to exonerate
about 36% of those falsely accused. The tests are absolutely
conclusive when the accused party is excluded as a possible
father and can only be used for this purpose. In Denver the
courts and the lawyers are fortunate in having Dr. E. R.
Mugrage, clinical pathologist of the Colorado General Hospital available. Dr. Mugrage has made an exhaustive study
into this subject and his ability is known throughout the
country.
Within a short time the legal profession of the United
States doubtless will recognize the many possibilities of blood
tests as evidence.
References:
Landsteiner, K., and Levine, P.: On individual differences in
human blood. Jour. Exper. Med., 92: 610-615, 1929.
Ottenberg, Reuben: Medicolegal application of human blood
grouping. Jour. Am. Med. Assn., 79: 2137-2139, 1922.
Schiff, F.: The medicolegal significance of blood groups. Lancet,
2: 921-922, 1929.
Weiner, Alexander S.: Determination of non-paternity by means

of blood groups. Am. Jour. Med. Sciences, 257, 1933.
Wigmore's Supplement, 1923-1933.

DID YOU KNOW?
EMERGENCY AND SAFETY CLAUSES
By ERL H. ELLIS, of the Denver Bar
Rule 1: If a law bears the safety clause but not the
emergency clause then the act cannot be referred to the people.
But the act does not become effective until ninety days after
its passage.
Rule 2: If the act contains the emergency clause and not
the safety clause then the act does not take effect until ninety
days after the adjournment of the Legislature and the bill may
be, during that period, referred to the people (unless it is a
general appropriation bill which is not referable, and such act
would take effect immediately). Generally, then, the emergency clause without the safety clause is without force or
effect.
Rule 3: If an act contains both the emergency and
safety clauses it becomes effective immediately (or when made
effective by its terms) and may not be referred to the people.
Rule 4: The safety clause is a part of the act itself, and
is a conclusive finding by the Legislature that the law is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health
or safety, and the courts cannot consider the question of
whether or not there was any logic to such a declaration. Being a part of the act, there is no separate vote on the safety
clause and referendum is prevented by a majority vote.
Rule 5: The emergency clause is not a part of the act.
It is a separate act requiring a two-thirds vote of all of the
elected members of each house. If it is not adopted it is
stricken out upon final enrollment of a clerical matter and it
is not an amendment to the bill itself.
Chief Colorado Cases: 18 Colo. 291; 54 Colo. 262;
61 Colo. 422; 62 Colo. 4; 66 Colo. 319; 74 Colo. 27; and
94 Colo. 101.
Those in italics are the more important.
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INTO THE VALLEY OF DEATH RODE THE SIX HUNDRED
Out of Neil West Kimball, by Colorado of the 25th ult., is this:
"The Versatile Judge Adams.
"The following is copied from the official report of the recent
inaugural ceremony, as recorded in the Journal of the House of Representatives for January 8: 'Chief Justice Adams administered the oath
of office, and fired the governor's salute of nineteen guns simultaneously.'"
In 1934 Christmas fell on Tuesday, the 25th.
WHY?
From a Denver weekly, devoted to legal advertisements, but with.
nevertheless, a broad outlook, we learn, with the forwarding assistance
of Edward T. Fiske, Esq., local solicitor, that:
"A Word to the Members.
and ----------- before
"If the members will consult ----------------they set dates joy, in sorrow, or God forbid, it will be great appreciated."
"NORTH SIDE WOMAN'S CLUB
Tuesday, March 5, 2:30 P. M., Woodbury branch library.
Topic: Travelog."
Speaker: Mrs. Earl Wettengel.
-Rocky Mountain News, March 3, 1935.

LOBBY BEFORE YOU LEAP
On January 15 the Editor-in-Chief suggested to us that we razz
(or give-the-bird-to) the current legislature. We shall do so after the
adjournment of that distinguished body. Just now we are lobbying
and do not care to incur the solons' wrath.
As Mark Twain said, never call a man a liar to his face if you
can do it by telephone.
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IN FACT, A PERFECT TITLE.

TILL HUEY GETS IT.

The President of the Denver Bar Association, alias G. Dexter
Blount, Esq., says to us:
"A certain party contracted to buy a large tract of land in LouisThe abstract of title
iana, subject to abstract showing a good title.
[We'll
was turned over to the purchaser's lawyer for examination.
After going over the title, the lawyer
bet it was Golding Fairfield.]
pronounced it good as far back as the United States Government title,
but requested a record dating back further than the complete abstract
that was furnished.
"Herewith is the reply to his request:
There are no records or archives available which
" 'Dear Sir:
concern the title to the above described land any further back than
the United States Government.
"'However, I believe from a historical standpoint, I can enlighten
you as to the title in such a way that the objections you have pointed
out will be waived.
"'This land was acquired by the United States Government in
1803 by purchase from France under what we now refer to as the
Louisiana Purchase.
" 'France acquired possession of the land by conquest as the result
of a successful war with Spain.
" 'Spain acquired possession of the land by virtue of the fact that
a young man in her service by the name of Christopher Columbus on
the 12th day of October, 1492, discovered it and claimed it for Spain.
" 'Columbus got his authority for making the aforesaid voyage
and discovery from Ferdinand and Isabella, the King and Queen of
Spain.
" 'Ferdinand and Isabella got their authority for sponsoring the
voyage from the Pope of Rome.
" 'The Pope of Rome got his authority by virtue of the fact that
he was the Vicar of Christ on Earth.
" 'Christ got his authority by the fact He was the Son of God
and God created the earth.'
WE GIVE THE REPUBLICANS A BREAK
M. W. White, Esq., County Court Old-Age-Pension tycoon, almost dies laughing when he tells this story, and he tells it whenever
he can get someone to remain stationary long enough.
"Speaking of Columbus," says Mike, which we were not, "he
was the first Democrat. When he started out he didn't know where
he was going. When he got there he didn't know where he was.
And he did it
When he got back he didn't know where he had been.
all on borrowed money!"

CHATTEL MORTGAGES-RECORDING IN PROPER COUNT.Y-The Colo-

rado-New Mexico Wool Marheting Association vs. Mel H. Manning as Sheriff of Custer County-No. 13338-Decided January
21, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
The marketing association sued the sheriff of Custer County to
recover possession of certain wool. McKellar Brothers, owners of the
sheep, entered into a contract with the association, which was recorded
as a chattel mortgage in Fremont County. Under this contract an
advancement was made to McKellar Brothers by the association. The
sheep were kept on a ranch which lay partly in Fremont County and
partly in Custer County. The mortgage stated that it was on wool
"from," not "on" the sheep. The sheep were ranged in both counties.
The wool was sheared in Custer County and stored in the said county
when seized by the sheriff. The judgment below was for the defendant.
1. Since the mortgage was on wool severed from the sheep, the
mortgage should have been recorded in Custer County.-Judgment
affirmed.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE--SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF SEPARATION
AGREEMENTS-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ACT OF 1933-Titus

vs. Titus-No. 13513-DecidedJanuary 21, 1935--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Suit for specific performance of separation agreement and property
settlement between husband and wife wherein husband agreed to pay
$175 per month but defaulted. The separation agreement provided
that its terms "may be enforced by proceedings in the usual form for
specific performance of contracts."
The husband failed to make the payments and suit was instituted
to which the husband interposed two defenses, namely, first, that in a
former suit for specific performance a final judgment had been entered
denying the application by the wife and, second, that the 1933 statute
relating to "Marriage and Divorce" which, among other things, provides that any judgment denying specific performance shall be no bar to
a new action was and is unconstitutional.
There was a demurrer to the two defenses above mentioned which
was overruled by the trial court.
The statute was alleged to be unconstitutional on three grounds,
namely, that the statute contained more than one subject; that it was
an ex post facto law; that the legislature had invaded the powers of
the judicial department.
HELD: The demurrer to the defenses should have been sustained.
The provisions of the Act are not inconsistent with the title; the fact
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that the Act creates relief which had formerly been denied by the court
in a similar proceeding does not make the Act an ex post facto law
because the provisions are remedial in character; the remedy provided by
this statute is not an invasion of the power of the judicial department.
-Judgment reversed.
FRAUD--ACTION TO SET ASIDE DEED-ALLEGATIONS AND PROOFFALSE REPRESENTATIONS-DeVinna et al. vs. The Southern

Colorado Bank of Pueblo-No. 13116-Decided January 28,
1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
1. In an action to set aside a deed as a fraud on creditors, the
plaintiff must allege and prove that the debt due him existed at the time
of the conveyance, or that the conveyance was made with a view to the
creation of future debts; also that at the time of the transfer the debtor
did not have sufficient other assets subject to execution to pay his debts.
2. A false statement made to one person, long prior to the creation of the debt in question and with no relation to it, repeated to a
third person by one who knew or should have known of its falsity, is
not such a false representation to the third person for which the maker
of the statement can be held in an action for fraud.--Judgment reversed.
CRIMINAL LAW-CONFIDENCE GAME-FALSE PRETENSES-INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-Davis vs. The People-No. 13606-

Decided January 28, 1935---Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Davis was convicted of the crime of confidence game and was sen-

tenced to a term of eight to twelve years.
1. The crime of confidence game involves the use of some false or
bogus means, token, symbol or device.
2. Where there is an absence of such, mere words, however false
or fraudulent, do not constitute the crime of confidence game.
3. Evidence held insufficient to sustain the verdict of guilty.Judgment reversed with directions to dismiss.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ORDINANCES-CIVIL SERVICE-Mayor,

Council and Manager of the City of Colorado Springs vs. Sanders
and Others-No. 13628-Decided January 28, 1935--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Mandamus to reinstate three patrolmen dismissed without fault or

delinquency by plaintiffs in error, under city ordinance providing efficiency tests to determine order of dismissals of city employees in such
cases. Defendants in error were in the classified Civil Service, with time
priority over others not dismissed.
HELD: By the City Charter, adopted under Article 20, Colorado
Constitution, Civil Service regulations provide for dismissal without
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fault or delinquency, in inverse order of appointment. The city ordinance is an unauthorized exercise of power under the City Charter, and
as such invalid.-Affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-MALICIOUS MISCHIEF-INTENT-Morris Schtul vs.

The People of the State of Colorado-No. 13632-Decided January 28, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
The defendant was charged with violation of Section 6974 of the
Compiled Laws of 1921. The defendant was operating his tractor on
a highway in a deep snow. On account of the condition of the road
the tractor became mired down, and he was unable to proceed farther.
He then turned into a neighbor's property, where he could proceed
directly to his own place by the shortest route. In driving over his
neighbor's property it was necessary to cut the wires of his neighbor's
fence. There was no evidence of any ill feeling between the defendant
and his neighbor prior to this act, because of which a complaint was
made. The defendant was found guilty.
1. There is no evidence of expressed malice nor such malice as the
statute contemplates, nor can it be implied that the defendant was actuated by a desire to injure the complaining witness by cutting his fence.
-Judgment reversed.
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES-TRUSTS-CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS

-Ireland us. Hudson, Executor-No. 13344-Decided February
4, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Ireland was sole owner of the stock of an incorporated collection
agency. In his will he provided that the agency be run by trustees; the
net income to go, one-half to his wife and one-half to his sister for their
lives; the whole to go to the survivor for her life, then to the employees
of the company in certain proportions. The wife seeks to break this
trust for the employees as void under the rule against perpetuities.
HELD:

1. The intent of the testator must, if possible, be ascertained and
followed.
2. The presumption is that the testator disposed of all his property.
3. That the interests granted are absolute unless specifically
qualified.
4. An unlimited gift of income without specific disposition of
the corpus is deemed to be a gift of the corpus.
5. The corpus, here, is a framework of employees upheld by their
efficiency and the good willt of the business; aside from this it has little
value. The gift of the income to the employees forever is construed to
be an absolute gift of the corpus to the employees and not void under
the rule against perpetuities.--Judgmentaffirmed.
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WATER RIGHTS - ADJUDICATED PRIORITIES - MODIFICATION BY
CONTRACT-RATIFICATION OF CONTRACT BY STOCKHOLDERSLACHES-CONSIDERATION-ULTRA VIRES-Kurtz us. The Re-

organized Catlin Canal Company et al.-No. 13268-Decided
February 4, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
1. Owners of decreed water rights can change the manner of enjoyment thereof, by contract entered into after the adjudication decree
has been rendered.
2. A corporation being a party to such a contract, its stockholders
can effectively approve the agreement either immediately upon its execution or at some later time.
3. The doctrine of laches operates adversely to stockholders who
for thirty years had taken no prior action in opposition to such an
agreement.
4. The contract, being based upon mutual concessions; is not
lacking in consideration, nor does it rest upon an illegal consideration;
and it is not attended with public interest.
5. An irrigation company, having broad powers as set out in its
articles, and as naturally pertain to such companies, acts within the
reasonable scope of its powers when it compromises a suit attacking its
irrigation priorities and settles the questioned matter by contract.Judgment affirmed.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - ALTERATIONS - RATIFICATION ESTOPPEL-Newmyer vs. Newmyer-No. 13640-Decided Feb-

ruary 4, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
Action on promissory note dated March 1, 1926, and plaintiff
alleges that in 1929 by consent and agreement of the parties the due
date was changed from March 1, 1931, to March 1, 1930. The defenses-alteration above-mentioned made with the defendant's consent
and thereby voided and discharged the obligation. The trial court
found that several years before this suit the plaintiff and defendant had
a dispute regarding certain properties and in that other suit the defendant
herein set up the claim that the particular promissory note sued on in
this suit had been given to the plaintiff as a valid and binding obligation. In other words, in the former suit, the defendant claimed that
this particular promissory note, with the alteration thereof, was a valid
obligation and in this suit claims that it is invalid because of the alteration.
HELD: Since the defendant claimed the note was valid in the
accounting action and received the benefit thereof, she ratified and acquiesced in the alteration aand cannot now successfully claim that the note
is void in this suit.--Judgment affirmed.
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WATERS-PLEADING AND PRACTICE-NECESSARY PARTIES--A. M.

Cox et al. vs. Marie Olsen et al.-No. 13325-Decided February
4, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
The plaintiffs in error, who were the defendants below, and the
defendants in error, plaintiffs below, together owned a one-eighth interest in a certain ditch and water right. The other seven-eighths interest
was owned by a tFfird, person, not a party to this suit. Objection was
made by the defendants during the course of the trial because of the
lack of necessary parties and the court below placed the burden of maintenance and repair wholly upon the owners of the one-eighth interest
and further barred the owner of the seven-eighths interest from any
regulation in connection with the headgate. The decree was entered for
the plaintiffs below.
1. Because the decree affected the rights of the owner of the other
seven-eighths interest in the ditch, such owner should have been a party
in the suit.
2. A court cannot authorize a water commissioner to determine
and divide water after it leaves the headgate as between the users thereof,
as there is no authority for it in the statute.--Judgment reversed.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-MANDAMUS-CHARTER PROVISIONSSURGEON Milliken as Manager of
Safety and Excise vs. Menser-No. 13357-DecidedFebruary 11,
1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
CIVIL SERVICE-POLICE

To review a judgment, making peremptory an alternative writ of
mandamus sued out by Menser this writ is prosecuted by Milliken.
Prior to June 18, 1918, Menser served in the police department of Denver as a provisional police surgeon. On that date Civil Service Commission submitted an eligible list of three for the position of police surgeon.
Menser was third on the list and received the appointment after he and
his wife had in writing waived any benefits from the Police Relief Fund.
1. Charter provisions of Denver relating to pension rights in the
police department. fall under two classifications, first, where the applicant
has attained thd age of 60 years and has been in the service for not less
than 20 years and is certified by two physicians to be disabled and, second, where the applicant, regardless of age or length of service, suffers
physical injuries resulting in total disability, while engaged in the line
of duty.
2. Under the charter provisions of Denver no age limit is fixed

124

DICTA

for the position of police surgeon, although age limit applies to other
positions in the police department.
3. There being no charter age limit applicable to the position of
police surgeon, the waiver that Menser signed was a nullity and he
waived nothing thereby.
4. Menser, being over the age of 60 years at the time of his application for pension and not having been an active member of the department for 20 years preceding, does not fall within the first classification
but comes within the second classification.
5. Under the second classification, physical injuries sustained
while engaged in the line of duty must result in total disability, and that
disability must be traceable to such injuries and not otherwise, and
where it does not affirmatively appear from the report of the examining
physician that Menser's disability is so traceable, the finding of the Manager of Safety that Menser was ineligible to the pension cannot be disturbed, in the absence of abuse of discretion.--Judgment reversed.

PUBLIC DOMAIN

-

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

-

TEMPORARY INJUNC-

TION-Wyman vs. Bell et aL.-No. 13063-DecidedFebruary 4,
1935--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
Defendant below was held in contempt for grazing his sheep on
cattle range in violation of a temporary injunction issued under the
Public Domain Range Act. (Ch. 125, S. L. 1929).
1. The evidence tends to show that the grazing was not limited
to occasional grazing while the sheep of defendant were in transit across
the range to lands leased by him.
2. The Public Range Act is constitutional.
3. Any objection as to the power of the court to enter the injunction was waived by defendants consenting to its entry.-Judgment
affirmed.
WATERS-NoN-USER-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS -EASEMENTS-

The Fruit Growers Ditch and Reservoir Co. vs. James W. Donald
13385-Decided February 11, 1935-Opinion by Mr.
-No.
Justice Campbell.
This is a controversy between Donald and Fruit Growers Ditch
and Reservoir Company concerning alleged ownership of the rights of
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Donald in and to one-half foot of water for irrigating his forty-acre
tract of land. Donald prevailed below.
1. Mere non-user of an easement acquired by grant, however long
continued, does not create an abandonment. This occurs only where
in connection with non-user there is a denial of title or some act by an
adverse party, or attendant facts and circumstances showing an intention
on the part of the owner of the easement to abandon it and the mere
fact that the non-user continues for the prescriptive period is immaterial,
in the absence of any adverse acts on the part of the servient owner.
2. Where an easement in a ditch is created by deed such a right
cannot be lost or abandoned by non-user alone short of the period for
limitations of an action to recover real property, which is twenty years
in Colorado.---Judgmentaffirmed.

HUSBAND
AND WIFE-MARRIAGE-DIVORCE-PRESUMPTIONSBURDEN OF PROOF-Minerva E. Jones vs. Carl S. Milliken as

Trustee of the Police Relief Fund and Myra S. Jones-No. 13305
-Decided February 25, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice
Butler.
Jones married Myra in 1881 and they separated in 1901 when
Jones commenced work as an officer on the Denver police force. In
1902 Jones went through a marriage ceremony with Minerva and
continued to live with her until his death in 193 1.
Question: Whether Minerva or Myra was the legal widow and
as such entitled to receive a pension.
Held:
The law presumes innocence, not guilt; morality, not immorality; marriage, not concubinage. It follows that there is a presumption that the second marriage is valid and that all obstacles thereto,
if any, had been removed; that presumption is not overcome by a
presumption that a former marriage once shown to exist continues.
The presumption in favor of a second marriage is not conclusive. However, one attacking such marriage has the burden of proving its invalidity.
When evidence is introduced tending to show the invalidity of a second
marriage the question of its invalidity is to be determined by the jury
or by the Court when sitting without a jury, in the light of all facts
and circumstances in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom. The facts of this case disclose that there had been no prior
divorce and therefore the second marriage was invalid. The trial Court
so found and its finding will not be disturbed.--Judgment affirmed.
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CRIMINAL LAW-ACCESSORIES--JURISDICTION OF COURT-WITHDRAWAL FROM CRIME-VALUE OF PROPERTY-Newton us. The

People-No. 13637-Decided February 4, 1935--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Burke.
The plaintiff in error, who was the defendant below, was tried
and convicted of the crime of grand larceny. The facts show that
Mrs. Newton, a resident of New Mexico, never entered the State of
Colorado but she perpetrated, aided and abetted and gave encouragement
to and furnished articles with which others shot and killed a steer in the
State of Colorado, which they carried to New Mexico and which was
consumed by these persons and the defendant, Newton.
I. Mrs. Newton was clearly an accessory and by being such is
deemed a principal by our statutes, Section 6645, C. L. 1921.
II. The courts of Colorado clearly had jurisdiction over the defendant, Newton, even though she never entered this state.
III. There is no evidence of a withdrawal from the enterprise on
the part of the defendant.
IV. Even though at the trial there was no proof of the value
of the steer, under Section 6728, C. L. 1921, the theft of livestock is
grand larceny regardless of value.-Judgment affirmed.
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